*To negate is to deny the truth of the resolution.* Presumeneg since a) Statements are presumed false rather than true since any given collection of words is more likely to be true than false – there’s more objections to any given argument than reasons in support of it. b) Resolved is defined as taking strong stance in support , so there’s an affirmative burden of proof on to prove the statement. Not knowing – presumption – is not a strong support. Textuality is the basis for all predictable ground. I value morality. Morals assume people have value as they guide human action. It is axiomatic that killing is wrong - Ewin

R. E. Ewin “What Is Wrong with Killing People?” The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 87 (Apr., 1972).

There is an argument that might be constructed along lines similar to something that Moore wrote elsewhere, though I have no wish to father the argument on to his moral philosophy. The argument goes like this: **I am more certain of the truth of the claim that there is a hand before my face than I could be of any statement used as a premiss in an argument to prove or disprove it**.4 A similar claim about killing might be well calculated to evoke a sympathetic reaction, especially if one considers that **philosophers have presented** so **many different moral theories purporting to provide arguments supporting such claims as that killing is wrong,** as to make the mind reel. **Universal agreement about the theories has yet to be reached, but rejection of the claim that killing is wrong has been very rare** indeed. Perhaps the reason for this is the one suggested by Moore's proof of an external world **: I am more certain of the truth of the claim that killing is wrong than I could be of any statement used as a premiss in an argument to prove or disprove it.**

We assume killing is bad absent reason to believe otherwise thus the burden of proof is on the affirmative. Thus the **affirmative burden** is to demonstrate that there is non-morally arbitrary exception to the prohibition on killing. Any morally arbitrary deviation from a moral norm would necessarily be wrong since it would literally be doing something bad without justification. Next, aggregation is incoherent since a) sacrificing any one person to promote the good is still not being moral, because it’s not respecting each person’s worth. Aggregation might promote some agent neutral good, but by definition it can’t respect the individual. b) Harm can only be done individual – for example, I can kill both frank and joe at the same time, but I can’t kill them together – harm is necessarily assigned to a person, not a larger collective organism that can weigh across people

Contention one - Previous wrongs don’t justify future wrongs Spencer explains. As already said (p. 15) the moral law must be the law of the perfect man—the law in obedience to which perfection consists. There are but two propositions for us to choose between. It may either be asserted that morality is a code of rules for the behaviour of man as he is—a code which recognises existing defects of character, and allows for them; or otherwise that it is a code of rules for the regulation of conduct amongst men as they should be. Of the first alternative we must say, that **any proposed system of morals which recognises existing defects, and countenances acts made needful by them, stands self-condemned;** seeing that, by the hypothesis, **acts thus excused are** not the best conceivable; that is are **not perfectly right—**not perfectly moral, and therefore a morality which permits them, is, in so far as it does this, not a morality at all. To escape from this contradiction is impossible, save by adopting the other alternative; namely, that **the moral law** ignoring all vicious conditions, defects, and incapacities, prescribes the conduct of an ideal humanity. Pure and absolute rectitude can alone be its subject matter. Its object must be to determine the relationships in which men ought to stand to each other—to point out the principles of action in a normal society. By successive propositions it **must aim to give a systematic statement of those conditions under which human[s]** beings **may harmoniously combine; and to this end it requires as its postulate, that those human beings be perfect**. Or we may term it the science of social life; a science that, in common with all other sciences, assumes perfection in the elements with which it deals.

The project of ethics is to discover what the world ought to look like, meaning any arguments based on previous iniquities don’t make future actions moral. Next, morality judges acts alone, since there no such thing as a reason behind an action: A) There’s no bright line as to how causally connected the mental state has to be to an action to be called a reason. Absent a brightline, anything could be called a reason making the term meaningless. B) Reasons are neither purely causal nor purely willed so they don’t make sense. For example: Imagine I get scared of failing a test, which causes me to choke and fail the test. The fear of failing was the “reason” why I failed, but it doesn’t seem like something I willed. The very idea of a reason is incoherent. Thus the reasons behind an action don’t matter, and the action is just killing someone so it’s morally wrong. Next, killing to defend one’s worth is futile: Otsuka[[1]](#footnote-1) summarizes Kamm,

Kamm's own [the] justification of constraints focuses on facts about the status of the potential victims of rights violations rather than facts about the agent who would-violate the constraint. Her view is that **constraints are justified because they reflect our elevated moral status as persons who are inviolable insofar as it is impermissible to sacrifice any one of us in order to realize the greater good** of minimizing the violation of constraints**. Our moral status as inviolable beings is greater than it would have been if it were legitimate to sacrifice any one of us** for the sake of minimizing evil. Kamm emphasizes that [because] the impermissibility of violating one person's constraint for the sake of preventing more of the same type of constraint from being violated does not imply the permissibility of the constraint violations that one is not permitted to prevent. Hence, even if we are, statistically speaking, more likely to be killed as a means when there are constraints against minimizing constraint violations, we are, morally speaking, less violable insofar as there are fewer constraints that it is permissible to violate

Next, exceptions to nonviolence for domestic violence will be arbitrary because domestic violence is often reciprocal- Laroche[[2]](#footnote-2):

When both partners had resorted to physical violence (47.4% of all cases of violence), 54.2% of women reported having been the first to use force, and 61.3% of men reported their spouse had been the first to use force, though the difference between men and women was not statistically significant (Morse, 1995: 265)**. Data from the 2001 National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health indicate[s] that** there was some violence in 24% of all relationships among a representative sample of 11,370 young US adults aged 18 to 28 years who reported on 18,761 heterosexual relationships in which they had been involved during the past 5 years. Close to half **(49.7%) of** the **violent relationships were reciprocally violent.** “In nonreciprocally violent relationships, women were the perpetrators in more than 70% of the cases.” (Whitaker, Haileyesus, Swahn, & Saltzman, 2007: 941). In other words, in at least 35% of violent relationships, violence was unilaterally perpetrated by women. Violence was unilaterally perpetrated by men in approximately 15% of violent relationships.

Thus, either party could claim an exception to the rule against nonviolence meaning the aff will either a) be authorizing someone who is an abuser themselves the right to kill, double turning themselves or b) arbitrarily deprive people of rights. Finally, the circumstances of aggression can’t rebut the presumption against violence. If we say that a killing was good because we did it for a good reason, we haven’t proven that the act of killing itself is good, but merely that the reason for the act was good. Therefore the aff action would still be morally wrong and thus impermissible, it would just have been done for a good reason.

1. “Review: Kamm on the Morality of Killing” The University of Chicago Press Reviewed work(s): *Morality, Mortality, Vol. 2, Rights, Duties, and Status.* by Frances M. Kamm *Ethics*, Vol. 108, No. 1 (Oct., 1997), pp. 197-207 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2382094 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Laroche, Denis. “Context and Consequences of Domestic Violence Against Women in Canada in 2004.” *Institut de la statistique du Quebec*. [www.stat.gouv.qc.ca](http://www.stat.gouv.qc.ca). April 2008. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)